Proceedings of the 54th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2021

How does Doctors’ Information Sharing Behavior Influence Reputation in
Online Health Consultation Platform?
Libo Liu
University of Melbourne
Libo.liu@unimelb.edu.au

Xiaofei Zhang
Nankai University
xiaofeizhang@nankai.edu.cn

Chunjun Zhang
University of Sydney
Czha7787@uni.sydney.edu.au

Zhimin Hua
Goldman Sachs
zhiminhua@gmail.com

Abstract
The online health consultation platforms provide a
unique context for doctors to share health information
privately and publicly. However, how doctors’
reputation is shaped in the context of online
information sharing has been largely neglected in the
current literature. This study explores the relationship
between information sharing and reputation by
distinguishing private and public information sharing
behaviours and investigating the contingent roles of
doctors’ professional and online seniority. Data from a
leading online consultation platform in China was
obtained to test the research model and associated
hypotheses. The results reveal that both private and
public sharing can contribute to doctors’ online
reputation and the effects of the two information
sharing behaviours are different about doctors within
different professional and online seniority. This study
contributes to the literature on health information
sharing and online reputation development.

1. Introduction
Online health platforms provide a new approach for
patients and doctors to exchange health and even
medical information [1]. As such platforms can
overcome the geographic constraints and have a greater
scope of health information recipients (e.g., patients
and their relatives), as increasing number of doctors are
using the online platforms to conduct online health
consultations and share knowledge [2]. The previous
literature has verified doctors’ online information
sharing can benefit patients’ health management [3]
and reduce the health disparities between rural and
urban areas [4, 5].
Researchers from the fields of psychology,
sociology, economics, and political sciences assume
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that all human actions are ultimately directed toward
self-interest. As rational beings, humans look for
returns (e.g., prizes, reputation and recognition) by
maximizing their benefits and minimizing their costs in
the process of information exchange with others [6].
This behavioural perspective has been widely adopted
in previous studies [7, 8]. Individuals share and
contribute their knowledge to gain informal
recognition and establish themselves as experts [7, 8].
Therefore, it is important to understand how
information sharing on online heath consultation
(OHC) platforms impacts doctors’ reputation. Such
insights into doctors’ information sharing behaviours
will help us to better understand how reputation is
influences by these behaviours in OHC context, and
also assist doctors to develop better relationship with
patients and improve their online services.
Information sharing has been an important area of
IS research for nearly two decades [9-13]. Given the
increasing proliferation of the Internet, individuals
from diverse organizational, national, and cultural
backgrounds are able to easily exchange information
with others in online community [13-15]. Information
sharing on OHC platforms is different from traditional
online communities in the sense that it focuses on
communication and consultation with patients, whereas
traditional information sharing are shared with
unknown online crowds. Trusov, Bucklin and Pauwels
[16] reported that user-generated content on social
media is seen as a reliable and valuable asset that has
significant influence on user decision-making.
Prior research has shown that online reputation can
be built through several alternative mechanisms, such
as (1) online feedback [17, 18], (2) social interactions
[19], (3) past contributions [20], (4) quality of
responses posted [20-22] and (5) trust between the
online interacting parties [17]. In this study, we focus
on two mechanisms including online feedback and past
contributions on online reputation building.
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Table 1. Definition of online reputation
Definition of Reputation
Sources
An attribute or a set of attributes ascribed to a firm, inferred from the firm’s past
[23-25]
actions
Public’s cumulative judgments of firms over time; a global perception
[26]
Stakeholders’ knowledge and emotional reactions—affect, esteem—toward a firm
[27, 28]
Level of awareness that a firm has could develop for itself and for its brands;
[29]
Consumers’ expectations and beliefs about a firm’s products quality
[30-32]
Consumers’ impressions of a company that is producing and selling a given product [33]
or brand
Perceptions and beliefs about a firm based on previous interactions
[34, 35]
Organizational reputation can be conceptualized as comprising two dimensions (1)
[36]
a perceived quality dimension and (2) a prominence
dimension
Reputation signal publics about how a firm’s products, jobs, strategies, and
[28]
prospects compare to those of competing firm.
Reputation is characterized as an amalgamation of quality and prominence
[37]
dimensions.
Individual
An observer’s impression of an actor’s disposition to behave in a certain manner
[38]
A prevailing collective agreement about an actor’s attributes or achievement based
[39, 40]
on what the relevant public “knows” about the actor
A characteristic or an attribute ascribed to an actor based on its past actions
[41, 42]
Estimation of the consistency over time of an attribute of an entity
[43]
Public esteem or high regard
[44]
Particularly, we looked at two types of information
relation to the influence of doctors’ information
sharing in OHC platforms: (1) public information
sharing on reputation.
sharing and (2) private information sharing. A closer
examination of these types of contributions indicates
The reminder of this paper is structured as follows.
that the influence of these sharing behaviour on
First, we introduce our research model and present
doctors’ reputation differ. We argue that private
hypotheses development. We then describe the
information sharing has more influence on online
methodology of the study and present the results of
doctors’ reputation than public information sharing.
data analysis. Finally, we conclude with the discussion
Moreover, we are interested in how seniority (i.e.,
of the implications, as well as the limitations of our
online seniority and offline seniority) moderates the
work.
effect of two types of information sharing on online
doctors’ reputation.
2. Literature Review
Perspectives
Firm

We conducted a field study to compare the effects
of information sharing (i.e., public information sharing
and private information sharing) on doctors’ reputation
in which we manipulate information sharing using a
natural approach. To elaborate, there are two types of
information sharing in OHC platforms. Public
information sharing refers to doctors’ information
sharing to public in OHC platforms, which means
public information sharing is visible to all users.
Private information sharing refers to doctors’ feedback
and recommendations to patients’ questions. This
information is only visible to patients who raise up the
questions. The latter manipulation aligns with OHC
platforms design. This enables us to use behavioural
data
from
Good
Doctor
Online
(https://www.haodf.com) to test our hypotheses in

2.1 Reputation
Researchers define reputation as a global
impression of a company drawing on institutional
theory. Reputation is defined as a output of information
exchange and social influence [36, 45, 46]. A review of
research on organizational reputation in the
management, economics, sociology, and marketing
literature reveals that two types of thought are the
primarily informants of the construct’s definition [47].
Scholars studying reputation from an economic
perspective tend to define it as the observers’
expectations or estimations of a specific organizational
attribute [30, 31]. Companies reduce information
asymmetries and market uncertainty, when they make
choices that reveal their “true” attributes, which serve
as signals that enable buyers to assess relevant
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company attributes [28]. That means reputation
reduces stakeholders’ concerns about the quality of
products in turn to influence companies’ economic
outcomes [32]. Research indicates that uncertainty can
be reduced through the exchange of information in an
organizational context. We summarize the definitions
of reputation shown in Table 1.

Perspectives
Firm

Individual

mechanism parameters affect market efficiency. Ba
and Pavlou [17] examined whether good reputations
generate product price premiums. Researchers have
examined the impact on online reputation and measure
it by the valence of user-generated online reviews that
has been shown to be an important performance metric,
including books [52], restaurants [53], and video
games [54].

Table 2. Antecedents of reputation
Antecedents of Reputation
Theory
Research
Context
Appropriate feedback mechanisms;
Game theory
Electronic
Positive and negative feedback ratings;
commerce
Trust;
Expensive Product;
Price premiums
Product quality; Ratings
n.a.
Online review on
hotel
Sellers’ strategic retaliation behaviour
n.a.
eBay

Ratings of the seller

n.a.

Online feedback mechanisms,
social interactions
Obligations and controls associated
with a seller’s legal status;
seller’s local institutional quality
Past contributions
Social voting
Good answers
Answer quality

Game Theory &
Signaling theory
Signalling
theory

Social interaction

n.a.

In the healthcare context, Ivanov and Sharman [37]
found that perception of quality has a significantly
influence on a hospital’s reputation. Perception of
quality is influenced by information about
organization’s underlying capabilities to produce
quality goods or services. Based on prior studies of
reputation, we define doctor’s online reputation as
impression of a doctor’s online service, which serve as
signals that enable patients to assess doctor’s relevant
service information. It would reduce information
asymmetries within patient-doctor interactions.
A large proportion of the existing literature focuses
on reputation systems in online communities.
Dellarocas [51] studied the reputation mechanism in
eBay trading environments to examine how

Online trading
communities
Online health
communities
Online B2B

Source
Ba and Pavlou
[17]

Hollenbeck [22]
Ye, Gao and
Viswanathan
[18]
Aperjis and
Johari [48]
Khurana, Qiu
and Kumar [49]
Lanzolla and
Frankort [50]

n.a

Social Q&A
sites

Paul, Hong and
Chi [20]

n.a

online technical
Q&A forum
Online social
networks

Hart and Sarma
[21]
Bapna, Gupta,
Rice and
Sundararajan
[19]

Havakhor and Sabherwal [55] indicated that
reputation signal refers to a signal that indicates the
knowledge of a user in a virtual setting. These signals
have been primarily used in context of online
communities. Individuals look for returns (e.g.,
reputation and influence) in the process of information
exchange with others [56]. The latter perspective has
been widely adopted in previous customer information
sharing studies [57-60] in which reputation has been
recognized as a key driver of content contribution in
social media. Individuals share and contribute
knowledge to gain informal recognition [7, 8]. We
summarized the antecedents of online reputation in
Table 2.
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Prior research has shown that online reputation can
be built through several alternative mechanisms, such
as (1) online feedback [18, 61, 62], (2) social
interactions [63], (3) past contributions [64], (4) quality
of responses posted [21, 22, 64] and (5) trust between
the online interacting parties [61]. In this study, we
focus on two mechanisms including online feedback
(i.e., private information sharing) and past
contributions (i.e., doctor’s public information sharing)
on online reputation building.

3. Research
Development

Model

and

Hypotheses

Rindova, Williamson, Petkova and Sever [36]
conceptualized organizational reputation of as
consisting of perceived quality and prominence.
Perceived quality refers to the degree to which
stakeholders evaluate an organization positively on a
specific attributes, such as its ability to produce quality
products. Perceived quality can be measured by the
ratings from stakeholders [37]. Prominence refers to
the degree to which an organisation enjoys collective
recognition in its industry. Prominence can be
measured through the evaluation among peers [37]. We
adapt the two-dimensional model of reputation to
investigate the antecedents of online reputation in
online healthcare platform. We propose that online
reputation will be influence by both public information
sharing and private sharing. Moreover, service
providers’ characteristics (i.e., professional seniority
and online seniority) will moderate the above
relationships. Figure 1 depicts the research model for
this study.

In OHC platforms, when doctors share information
(i.e., general information on one disease) this will be
displayed to all patients and users. A doctor’s
performance will be visible or be known only to all
users in an OHC platform. Given that visibility of
performance is a determinant of professional
knowledge, this information sharing behaviour
provides an opportunity for a doctor to manage his or
her public image and signal his or her desire for
establishing reputation to others. In OHC platforms,
doctors
can
share
private
feedback
and
recommendations to patients’ questions and requires,
which helps build a closer relationship between
patients and doctors. The private information sharing
provide an opportunity to let patients know their
doctors and trust them more. Zhang, Liu and Chen [67]
examined observational learning in the social network
of friends versus strangers. They found that
information cascades are more likely to occur in friend
networks than in stranger networks. Thus, we believe
that private information sharing carries a stronger
signal of doctor’s service quality than does public
information sharing, thus exerting a stronger impact on
doctor’s online reputation.
H1: Private information sharing will exert stronger
influence on reputation than will public information
sharing.

Figure 1. Research model

3.1
Public information
private information sharing

Scant research has examined information sharing
behaviour with regard to online health consultation
platform. The previous literature focuses on online
communities, in which users share ideas [65, 66]. It
takes a motivational perspective with an emphasis on
perceived benefits and perceived costs to discuss
knowledge contributions to online communities. A
doctor can share information on OHC platforms.
Doctors’ information sharing refers to doctors’
involvement in OHC platforms in which they share and
contribute their knowledge to gain informal
recognition and establish reputation (Constant et al,
1994). In this study, we looked at two types of
information sharing in an OCH platform: (1) public
information sharing and (2) private information
sharing. Public information sharing refers to doctors’
information sharing to public in OHC platforms.
Private information sharing refers to doctors’ feedback
and recommendations to patients’ questions. This type
of information sharing is only available to the patient
rather than to public.

sharing

versus

3.2

OHC platform usage seniority

Doctors with more experience in OHC platforms
usage means they conduct more online consultation for

Page 737

patients. A doctor’s OHC usage is nurtured as he/she
interacts with patients over time. A certain level of
shared understanding between doctors and patients
allows them to accumulate hands-on experience over
time (Zhang et al, 2018). In comparison to doctors with
fewer online platform experiences, doctors with longer
tenure have a better understanding of whether their
information (i.e., sharing views and experiences) are
relevant and valuable. These doctors might have
already accumulated more feedback and reviews from
patients. The positive feedback and reviews will
enhance the relationship between information sharing
and reputation. Therefore, we have the following
hypotheses:

that highly professional seniority will contribute to
reduction of doctors’ OHC platform sharing behaviour.
Therefore, we propose that:

4.

Research Methodology

H2a: The positive relationship between public
information sharing and reputation is moderated by
OHC platforms usage seniority.

4.1

Data

H2b: The positive relationship between private
information sharing and reputation is moderated by
OHC platforms usage seniority.

3.3

Professional seniority

The professional seniority refers to doctors’
professional abilities in hospitals. High professional
seniority implies to high practical experience in dealing
with patients. When consulting doctors with high
professional seniority interact patients, patients usually
benefit from the extensive practical experience and
perceive these doctors to have a higher reputation [68].
In OHC platforms, doctors’ professional seniority is
displayed in terms of years of professional, practical
experience of working with patients. Patients can find
doctors’ professional information and personal
information on OHC platforms. When consulting with
high-seniority doctors who have considerable
professional abilities and rich clinical experiences,
patients will feel that the doctors have better capability
to address their diseases compared to low-seniority
doctors. Even if the doctor with low professional
seniority shared more information with patients, they
are still likely to prefer to be consulted by doctors with
high professional seniority. Accordingly, we believe

H3a: The positive relationship between public
information sharing and reputation is moderated by
doctors’ professional seniority.
H3b: The positive relationship between private
information sharing and reputation is moderated by
doctors’ professional seniority.

We collected data from Good Doctor Online
(haodf.com), one of the best online health consultation
platforms in China. Based on an Alexa.com report,
Good Doctor Online had a traffic rank of 916 in China
as of February 2019. The daily browsing visitors is
over 3 million, and the daily number of online
consultations is round 300,000. This site had more than
580,000 doctors’ information from 9,379 registered
hospitals in China as of Dec 2018. Over 200,000
doctors registered in the platform and provide online
health consultation service. Each doctor can create a
personal profile on his or her home page. On the
personal profile, most doctors disclose information,
such as professional through tagging. In addition to
these personal statements, doctors may provide vision
statements and share their professional knowledge to
patients (www.haodf.com).

We sampled real doctors from Good Doctor Online
from Beijing City (developed area), Hainan Province
(developing
area),
and
Qinghai
Province
(underdeveloped area). For each doctor, we collected
profile information and personal information. To
ensure that the sample included only active doctors, we
focused on doctors who registered to the platform or
who had at least one review from patient. We excluded
inactive users as they would have artificially inflated
the significance of our results. The resulting sample
consisted of 3,554 doctors.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics and correlations
Variables
Mean
S.D.
1
2
3
4
5
6
1. Professional seniority
2.976
0.944
1
2. Online seniority
1512.220
1195.020
0.342
1
3. Public information sharing
6.090
29.334
0.127 0.217
1
4. Private information sharing
132.740
389.359
0.035 0.209
0.294
1
4. Reputation
3.678
0.283
0.210 0.338
0.241
0.494
5. Hospital level
8.708
1.167
0.125 0.084
0.018
0.048
1
6. City
5.958
4.152
0.015 0.225
0.072
0.102
0.243
1
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4.2 Operationalization of constructs
There are four hierarchical clinical titles for doctors
(i.e., resident doctor, attending doctor, associate chief
doctor, and chief doctor) in the Chinese health care
system [68]. For professional seniority, we used 1 to
represent clinician, 2 to represent attending doctor, 3
for associate senior doctor, and 4 for senior doctor.
Online seniority is operationalized as the total number
of days a doctor uses the platform. Public information
sharing is operationalized as the total number of
articles a doctor share to public in the platform. Private
information sharing is operationalized as the total
number of feedback a doctor provide to patient in the
platform. Reputation is operationalized as the rating of
the doctor received from the platform. There are ten
hierarchical level for hospital in the Chinese health
care system. Hospital level is using to indicate hospital
level. We use 10 to represent top level, and 1 to
represent lowest level of hospital. Table 3 presents the
summary of statistics and correlations of the variables.

5. Data Analysis and Results
Variables
Moderators
Professional Seniority
Online Seniority
Independent Variables
Public Information sharing
Private Information sharing
Interactions
Professional Seniority *
Public Information sharing
Professional Seniority *
Private Information sharing
Online Seniority *
Public Information sharing
Online Seniority *
Private Information sharing
Control Variables
City

To test our research model, we ran a linear
regression using SPSS. Table 4 presents the results of
the studied models. The first model tests the effects of
control variables including city and hospital level. The
second model tests the effects of independent variables
with control variables. The third model tests the effects
of independent variable with moderators. The fourth
model tests the moderating effect of online seniority.
The fifth model tests the moderating effect of
professional seniority.
In model 1, the regression results suggest that both
city and hospital level have significant effects on
doctors’ reputation (β = 0.448, p < 0.01; β = 0.217, p <
0.01). Model 1 explains 30.0% of the variation in
doctors’ reputation. Model 2 confirms the positive and
statistically significant effect of doctors’ professional
seniority on doctors’ reputation (β = 0.187, p < 0.01)
and the positive and statistically significant effect of
doctors’ online seniority on doctors’ reputation (β =
0.176, p < 0.01). Model 2 explains the variation of
doctors’ reputation by 32.9%.

Table 4. Analysis results of the main effects
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
0.187***
(0.005)
0.176***
(0.000005)

Model 4

0.164***
(0.004)
0.084***
(0.000004)

0.201***
(0.000005)

0.041***
(0.00015)
0.449***
(0.00001)

0.197***
(0.001)
0.306***
(0.000024)

0.448***
0.409***
0.401***
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.004)
Hospital Level
0.217***
0.070***
0.068***
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.003)
Observations
3,554
3,554
3,554
Adjust R-square
0.300
0.329
0.531
Notes: Standardized coefficients are reported; Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Model 5
0252***
(0.005)

-0.068
(0.001)
0.625***
(0.000042)
0.250**
(0.000350)
0.136***
(0.000013)

-0.169
(2.1558E-7)
0.201***
(1.0789E-8)
0.406***
(0.001)
0.073***
(0.004)
3,554
0.333

0.381***
(0.001)
0.109***
(0.003)
3,554
0.537
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Model 3 confirms the positive and statistically
significant effect of two moderators public information
sharing and private information sharing (β = 0.041, p <
0.01; β = 0.449, p < 0.01). A comparison of the two β
coefficients reveals that private information sharing is
the more influential predictor than public information
sharing (Wald t = 6.85, df = 1, p <0.0001), suggesting
that the greater the number of private information
sharing provided, the more reputation the doctors will
received. Thus, H1 is supported.
Model 4 test the moderation effect of online
seniority. Model 4 confirms the positive significant
moderating effect of online seniority on the
relationship between private information sharing on
doctors’ reputation (β = 0.201, p < 0.001). Therefore,
H2b is supported. However, online seniority doesn’t
show the moderating effect on the relationship between
public information sharing on doctors’ reputation. H2b
is not supported. Model 4 explains the variation of
doctors’ reputation by 33.3%.
Model 5 test the moderation effect of professional
seniority. It confirms significant moderating effect of
professional seniority on the relationship between
public information sharing on doctors’ reputation (β =
0.250, p < 0.05). Therefore, H3a is supported. The
result indicated the positive significant moderating
effect of professional seniority on the relationship
between private information sharing on doctors’
reputation (β = 0.136, p < 0.01). Thus, H3b is
supported. Model 5 explains the variation of doctors’
reputation by 53.7%. The results are summarized in
Table 2.

6. Conclusion and Discussion
In this study, we looked at two types of information
sharing in OHC platforms: (1) public information
sharing and (2) private information sharing. We argue
that private information sharing has more influence on
online doctors’ reputation than public information
sharing. Moreover, we are interested in how seniority
(i.e., online seniority and offline seniority) moderate
the effect of two types of information sharing on online
doctors’ reputation.
We conducted a field study to compare the effects
of information sharing (i.e., public information sharing
and private information sharing) on doctors’
reputation. The results show that private information
sharing exert stronger influence on reputation than will
private information sharing. Online seniority positively
moderates the relationship between private information
sharing and reputation. Professional seniority
positively moderated the relationship between

information sharing (i.e., private information sharing
and public information sharing) and reputation.

6.1. Theoretical Implications
This study contributes to the current literature in
several aspects. First, this study is one of the first to
explore how doctors generate reputation from both
public and private information sharing behaviour.
Second, this work enriches the literature of information
sharing by proposing two different sharing
mechanisms of doctors in online platforms and further
explore the relative effects of the two different sharing
behaviour on reputation development. Third, by
precisely exploring the contingent role of professional
and online seniority, this study also gains the
knowledge of doctors’ online sharing behaviours and
the corresponding outcomes. Practically, this study can
provide insight for doctors on how to manipulate their
online reputations from different information sharing
behaviour and how their sharing behaviours contribute
reputation about different doctor groups (based on
professional seniority and online seniority).

6.2. Practical Implications
This study also provides practical implications for
online physicians and platforms. We found that
physicians’ generalized and customized knowledge
sharing can increase their online reputation. Based on
this finding, physicians are first suggested to share
more customized knowledge to help patients to
increase the number of patient ratings. Physicians
should be more active in the online platforms to recruit
more patients, reply their inquires more quickly, and
provide useful information. Second, physicians can
also share more generalized information to increase
their reputation by publishing more patient education
articles and sending more health notices. Platforms can
also encourage patients to share more information to
patients. They can provide incentives to increase
physicians’ motivation to knowledge-sharing.

6.3. Limitations and Future Research
Our study is not without limitations. First, the
generalizability of our results may be limited because
we examined only one OHC platform in China. Future
studies should examine whether OHC plaforms from
other countries exhibit similar dynamics and compare
the impact of information sharing across different OHC
platforms. Second, our study measured private
information sharing behaviour by using aggregated
data. Future study could use social network analysis to
explore how network structure (e.g., strong tie and
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weak tie between doctors and patients) influence
doctors’ reputation. Finally, as the influence of private
information sharing on online reputation shows more
effects comparing with public information sharing,
future study could compare difference in moderating
effects of professional seniority and online seniority on
those relationships.
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